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This study addresses the issue of housing privatization in Russia in the course of the 1990s. 
Privatization was started to create a housing market in order to efficiently allocate resources 
in the use and production of housing, and to phase out the state budget financing of housing. 
The dwellings were offered to their residents free of payment. The objective of this study is 
to offer a better understanding of the structural components of privatization by formally 
modeling housing privatization decision from the household point of view. The model is 
based on a trade-off between certain value of renting and uncertain value of owning. Using 
the results of the theoretical model, an empirical model of the privatization decision from the 
point of view of the household is formulated.  
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1.  Introduction  
In the early 1990s the Russian government launched a series of measures to transfer 
ownership of municipal housing to the tenants. The Government promoted housing 
privatization or transferring the ownership of dwellings to the existing tenants, to enable the 
creation of a housing market, in particular a secondary housing market where the old housing 
stock can be traded. 
Advantages of a housing market, like that of any other market, are the efficient 
allocation of resources both in the use and production of housing, as well as reducing the 
search costs necessary for barter. In the Soviet Union, residents had no right to sell their 
housing but they could exchange their dwelling for another. The latter was possible only 
when there was a mutual coincidence of wants and the situation was highly inefficient. In a 
market situation the need to satisfy this double coincidence of wants is obviated. The market 
offers a supply of available housing from which the households wishing to acquire housing 
are able to choose. Similarly, households can sell their existing housing on the market and 
acquire the funds necessary to purchase housing that better fits their needs. 
The Government as an economic agent has been pursuing housing privatization 
policy in order to phase out state budget based financing of housing. Another objective has 
been to shift the maintenance and utility costs onto dwelling owners reducing a considerable 
burden on the state. 
An additional set of arguments for the creation of a housing market has to do with the 
linkage of housing markets to other markets for economic fundamentals, such as labor and 
capital markets. A well functioning housing market is important for improving economic 
performance as it facilitates geographical mobility of workers. The housing market also 
  2influences financial markets through mortgage lending and other use of housing assets as 
collateral in financial instruments. 
While the motivation for housing privatization has been similar across all post-
socialist countries, the Russian experience has been quite distinctive in its implementation. 
Unlike in many other post-socialist countries where housing was sold to the residents at 
discount prices, in Russia dwellings were offered to their residents free of payment following 
the transfer of ownership from the state to the municipalities. Nevertheless mass housing 
privatization did not take place even though by becoming owners of their dwellings, people 
acquire a valuable asset free of charge. The absence of payment for owning the dwelling 
makes the decision different to that of the choice under the right to buy policy in non-
transition economies, notably the U.K. and the Netherlands where public housing was 
offered for sale to the tenants in the early 1980s (Whitehead, 1993). While there has been 
little theoretical analysis of the right to buy, allowing for zero price and imperfect housing 
markets would make the tenure choice literature (Henderson and Ioannides, 1983, Rosen et 
al, 1984, Brueckner, 1986) applicable to analyze housing privatization in Russia.  
The research problem addressed in this study is why in Russia in the first half of the 
1990s there was a lackluster response to the homeownership offer. Despite the fact that 
privatization was free and despite public support for housing privatization, exemplified by 
70% of nationally surveyed households wishing to own their dwellings in 1993, only 18% of 
eligible dwellings were privatized in that year. (See Table 1 in the Appendix for the stated 
preference for privatization based on the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey and Table 
2 for annual 1989-2002 privatization levels from the State Statistical Agency). This paper 
offers an analytical perspective on why households did not privatize in the early 1990s 
  3despite stated preference for privatization and virtually costless ownership transfer
1.  The 
research objective is to suggest the determinants of household decision to privatize their 
dwellings. 
The paper is organized as follows: the remainder of this section contains the review of 
the literature on housing privatization in Russia and a brief discussion of the issue of 
maintenance of housing stock as it relates to the housing privatization decision. In Section 2 a 
theoretical model based on a trade-off between the certain value of renting and uncertain 
value of owning is developed. In Section 3 the logit model of the privatization decision is 
formulated using the results of the theoretical model. This section also includes a detailed 
account of the data used in the analysis. Section 4 concludes with suggestions for further 
research and policy implications. 
 
1.1 The Literature on Housing Privatization Decision  
 A limited number of studies addresses the determinants of the decision to become formal 
owners of the dwelling versus being an occupant and renting from the municipality in Russia. 
These studies are primarily descriptive and focus on the socio-economic background of those 
privatizing their dwellings. Also, most of them are studies of the emerging housing market in 
Moscow.  
Guzanova (1998) uses the data from the Moscow Longitudinal Survey to describe 
privatization trends in the city. She notes that the two groups most likely to privatize their 
apartments are the pensioners and the relatively wealthy. Unlike the emerging affluent 
stratum of the population, the elderly are not likely to sell the dwellings they privatize. She 
                                                 
1 A household wishing to privatize the dwelling had to submit to the municipality a notarized list of adult 
household members that were registered as residents at the address  
  4also suggests that sociological factors such as education are important determinants of the 
privatization decision. Bater (1994) provides a break-up of privatization status by 
occupational group in Moscow. By 1994, the highest share of privatized dwellings by 
occupation belonged to artistic professionals (53.5%), the second (43%) belonged to 
pensioners. The smallest share belonged to blue-collar workers (14.2%) and government 
employees (15.2%). This typology of privatization by occupation, calculated based on the 
occupation of the reported household head, does not take into account the possibility of joint 
decision-making by adult members of one household that belong to different professions. 
Lower share of privatization by workers and government employees can be explained by 
higher share of these occupational groups living in apartments belonging to the employer. 
Government agencies and industries were reluctant to give up ownership of the property and 
the tenants could not privatize as long as the property had not been transferred to municipal 
ownership.  
Winterbottom and Struyk (1995) use the survey data from 2200 Moscow households 
collected as part of the Urban Institute/USAID project. They report that households that 
privatize but do not sell their dwelling are poorer than state renters who have not privatized, 
suggesting the store-of-wealth explanation for housing ownership. They also report that 
apartments that have been privatized or sold on the market have higher area/person ratio. 
Struyk and Daniell (1994) study what type of families privatized their dwellings and 
why privatization levels are different across cities. Their hypothesis is that a dwelling is more 
likely to be privatized when its market value is high and when the tenants want to bequeath 
the dwelling; factors impeding privatization are uncertainty over maintenance and strong 
tenancy rights of municipal renters. The study uses survey data from seven Russian cities to 
  5estimate a logit model of privatization decision. The explanatory variable dwelling value was 
estimated using a hedonic model where prices for comparable apartments were reported by 
developers. The authors find that higher dwelling value has a positive effect on privatization. 
They also conclude that enterprise housing is less likely to be privatized than municipal. 
Older households are more likely to privatize. While the study established a positive 
relationship between intelligentsia (households with higher education) and privatization 
decision, professional categories had no effect on privatization decision. Zavitsa (2006) 
studies housing inequality in Russia and finds no association between transitions to different 
housing and household resources (e.g. income) and occupational status. A recent study by R. 
Yemtsov (2007) is concerned with whether homeownership post-privatization plays a part in 
rising income inequality. The author examines the data on privatization and income and 
suggests that income level was not related to how quickly the household privatized the 
dwelling.  
In contrast to Russia’s give-away of housing to the residents, state-owned housing in 
other transition economies was mainly sold to the tenants at below-market prices. Hegedus 
and Tosics (1994), Daniel (1997) identified the following factors as the most important ones 
in a households’ decision to buy their housing from the state: (i) the difference between 
perceived market value and the sale price, (ii) security of tenure (against perceived rent 
increases/possibility of eviction), and (iii) control over maintenance. In contrast to Russia 
where tenancy rights remained strong, the threat of eviction has been noted as a motive for 
housing privatization in transition countries outside of the former Soviet Union (Douglas, 
1996).  
1.2 Major Renovation and Maintenance of the Housing Stock 
  6The problem of major renovation of dilapidated housing stock in Russia has been the 
subject of policy debates and widely discussed in the media. Kosareva and Struyk (1993) 
suggest that it is uncertainty over the future cost of maintenance and major renovation of 
housing stock that has led to incomplete privatization in Russia. Provision of cheap housing 
was seen as part of the social contract between the state and the people and resulted in 
extremely low rent, subsidized utility payment and low-cost recovery from tenants. (The ratio 
of combined rent and utility payment to income was a low of 0.025 in the Soviet Union). No 
capital cost recovery was included in the rent contributing to the problem of deferring 
maintenance into the future and creating a backlog in renovation. Because of the distortions 
embedded in the socialist economic system the state was severely resource constrained and 
did not provide adequate maintenance. As evidenced by data in Table 3, in the 1990s the 
amount of housing undergoing major renovation each year was steadily decreasing and the 
amount of decrepit and unsafe housing increasing with the gap between the two widening
2. 
The backlog of maintenance carried over from the past may be prohibitive to finance for the 
residents, especially the low-income ones.  Lack of market mechanisms to finance major 
renovation backlog in Russia may have made renting from the municipality the preferred 
option for those who came to rely on the municipality and the state to resolve the major 
renovation issue.  
Besides major renovation the questions of routine maintenance and management of 
multi-family housing were likely to play a part as determinants of the privatization decision 
for multi-family dwelling residents in the early to mid 1990s. There were no private property 
                                                 
2 Real Estate section of the online news service lenta.ru reports in June 2009 that after the major 
renovation of buildings the price of dwellings in these renovated buildings increased on average by 20% in 
Moscow.  
 
  7management companies, no established homeowners associations or condominiums
3 and the 
management was continued to be performed by the municipal management committees 
essentially unaltered from the Soviet time. In the absence of alternatives to familiar 
municipal management remaining a municipal renter would have looked like a safer option 
compared to private ownership with less certain maintenance arrangements. These factors 
contributed to the fact that at the beginning of the housing reform period “being a state-tenant 
has been economically much more attractive than being an individual owner who bears all 
the maintenance costs” (Renaud, 1994). The following model captures these salient features 
of housing reform in Russia and illustrates the above reasoning.  
 
2. A Two-Period Model of Privatizing versus Renting 
With homeownership having a distinct advantage of housing becoming a potential 
source of income for the household, the option of renting from the municipality retained the 
familiar features of the state-owned housing system. In particular, rents have been usually 
low and utility payments continued to be subsidized. Tenancy rights have been strong with 
eviction occurring only if the housing was deemed unsafe. In order to explicitly consider 
behavioral foundations for privatization choice, the model developed in this study 
incorporates the effects of factors determining the decision to privatize, such as the level of 
                                                 
3 In the early 1990s there were no established homeowners associations or condominiums because of 
weak legal provisions to enable their functioning. Despite the legal provisions of the Housing code (first passed 
in 1996) designed to support the shift to management by home-owners, multi-family housing management 
largely remains in purview of municipalities. The insufficient progress in owner-management of multi-family 
dwellings is mainly due to difficulty in setting up financing of long-term maintenance.  In addition coordination 
problems of organizing dissimilar households in large buildings as well as adverse selection problems 
discourage residents from taking part in homeowners’ organizations. In recent years private property 
management companies have been established but merely at the high end of the market and in new buildings 
where major renovation is not an issue.  
 
 
  8maintenance payment, uncertainty of payment for maintenance, and the rate of time 
preference. The logit model then ascertains empirical regularities broadly based on the 
theoretical model developed below. 
 
2.1. Model Setup 
The model set up draws on earlier work by Brueckner (1986) and Henderson and 
Ioannides (1983). The household chooses between the uncertain value of owning the 
dwelling and renting which involves no uncertainty. We assume that the household 
maximizes a simple two-period utility function where the second period serves as a proxy for 
optimal decisions made in all the future periods as in the Henderson and Ioannides (1983) 
formulation. In the first period the household receives income, pays rent and utilities, and 
saves for the second period. A household that owns its property also pays the (uncertain) 
maintenance fee. The model is set up such that in the first period the owner's and renter’s 
utilities differ only by the uncertain maintenance payment. In other words, the owner and the 
renter are charged the same amount for housing by the municipality, but the owner 
additionally incurs the uncertain maintenance payment. This assumption is reflecting the fact 
that at the early stages of privatization during the early 1990s in order to encourage 
privatization of housing stock the government charged renters and owners the same heavily 
subsidized utility fee (Struyk and Daniell, 1994).   
In period two the owner enjoys the privilege of bequeathing their wealth by either 
first selling the dwelling and bequeathing the money, or directly bequeathing the dwelling in 
addition to savings from the first period. In contrast the renter household in the second period 
has only savings from the first period at its disposal.    
  9The household maximizes the expected utility of the consumption good expressed 
through the budget constraint. The consumption good serves as the numéraire with its price 
normalized to one. The household also consumes housing but the quantity of housing is fixed 
in this problem and the household only chooses whether or not to privatize the dwelling in 
which it resides. We use Y to denote income, and S to denote savings. In the model R stands 
for rent and K for the uncertain maintenance payment. Vs represents the increment to wealth 
from selling the privatized dwelling and VB is the bequest value of the dwelling. VS > VB 
because liquidity is preferred to non-liquidity. The economy-wide interest rate is given by r 
and   δ  is the individual’s rate of time preference. The consumer’s problem is stated as one 
of the two possible cases below: 
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where the second term can be denoted as terminal wealth,    B W
The household prefers selling to bequeathing but he may not always be able to sell. 
Parameter  may be interpreted as exogenous probability that the household is able to sell 
the dwelling. High value of  reflects the notion of thick markets.  
Θ
Θ
(II) If the household chooses to rent the dwelling, the problem takes the form of 








where the second term can be denoted as terminal wealth    R W
The consumer has a Quadratic Utility function given by   where c is 
consumption good. The characteristic of the quadratic utility function is that the impact of 
2 bc ac u − =
  10uncertainty of the consumer’s income can be described as a function of two statistical 
parameters only – the mean and the standard deviation. Such a consumer prefers a higher 
average income (measured by the expectation of the probability distribution achieved by 
holding any particular portfolio of assets) and lower variability of income (measured by the 
standard deviation). Consider first the case of household dwelling owner for whom 
 where K is uncertain in the first period. Using the fact that 
 we can rewrite the owner’s utility function as: 
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To solve the consumer’s problem we maximize utility with respect to savings and find the 
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Note that k μ − = − ( ) , i.e. that saving under ownership is less than saving for the 
renting case by the amount of expected maintenance payment. 
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We compare the expected utility of owning to certain utility of renting: 
 
which simplifies to: 
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Indifference between owning and renting implies that 0 = Ωdiff . Hence a parametric change 
that raises   makes owning more likely, and a parametric change that lowers   makes 
renting more likely. 
diff Ω diff Ω
We now do a few simple comparative static exercises. Evaluating the signs of the 

























Hence the household is more likely to privatize the higher is the value of bequest. Next we 
consider the two statistical parameters relating to the level of maintenance payment  k μ and 





















Once again as expected we find that the household is more likely to rent the higher is the 
maintenance payment or the more uncertain is the maintenance payment.    
The derivative with respect to the risk aversion parameter b, 
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  12is negative, indicating that the more risk averse households tend to choose to rent.   
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To interpret this condition one can think of the first term in the denominator, 
 as the benefit of owning,  . When  B s V V ) 1 ( Θ − + Θ own B δ  is high the expression is less 
negative implying that for the old privatization is more likely. The second term in the 
denominator  k r μ ) 1 ( +
k r
 can be thought of as the benefit of renting, . This is because  rent B
μ ) 1 ( +  is the amount the renter-household saves by not paying maintenance fee of the 
owner-household.  
The derivative with respect toΘ , the probability of selling the privatized dwelling on the 
market, is 




diff V V  
implying that privatization is more likely in active markets where probability of selling the 
dwelling is higher. 
3. The Logit Model 
The objective of this study is to describe decision-makers’ choices among alternatives 
of becoming the owner of its dwelling and renting from the municipality, and so a logit 
discrete choice model is used in the empirical part of the analysis. 
Discrete choice models usually assume utility maximizing behavior by the 
consumer
4. As suggested by the theoretical model in Section 2, the analysis below is based 
                                                 
2. It is important to note that utility maximization is not a requirement of discrete choice models. The model is 
consistent with utility maximization but it can be used to represent decision-making derived from other decision 
modes (Train, 2003, Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). A discrete choice model can support privatization choice as 
  13on the premise that the household will privatize the dwelling if it is more valuable.  That can 
be either because of the characteristics of the dwelling (higher quality lowers maintenance 
payment  K) and/or preferences of inhabitant household, such as lower risk aversion, 
perceived risk aversion, time discounting, household-specific value of sale, bequest. The 
theoretical model has been developed to motivate the specification of the econometric model. 
It must be noted that because of data constraints given the environment of undeveloped 
housing markets the set of available variables may not be ideal to operationalize the 
comparative static results. For example, as there were few transactions on the housing 
market, the market price was not available and the data on the number of transactions was 
not collected in the early 1990s.   
The theoretical model suggests that the level of maintenance payment is an important 
factor affecting utility and hence the choice between owning and renting one’s dwelling. 
Greater maintenance payment makes the household less likely to privatize. The level of 
maintenance is related to building quality, so higher maintenance is expected for buildings of 
lower quality and older buildings. Hence older buildings and those of lower quality are less 
likely to be privatized and, by the same reasoning, newer buildings and buildings of higher 
quality are more likely to be privatized.  
The theoretical model also suggests that risk aversion is inversely related to 
privatization. Risk aversion may have an intrinsic relationship with demographic 
characteristics such as age, education and income. The uncertainty factor may be lower for 
those with better information about future state. In this case the more educated people might 
have a better idea about how the question of maintenance will be resolved in the future, so 
                                                                                                                                                       
an outcome of utility maximization as well as an outcome of choice arrived at through learning or imitation 
behavior. 
 
  14the  k σ  parameter for perceived risk will be lower for people with greater levels of education. 
Hence education can be expected to be positively related to privatization. Another 
implication of the theoretical model is that households that have a higher rate of discounting 
the future, i.e. older households would be more likely to privatize. However if risk-aversion 
increases with age it would add a negative linkage between age and privatization. 
Assuming decreasing absolute risk aversion would suggest a positive relationship 
between income and privatization as those with higher income would be less risk averse. 
However there is also an argument for a negative relationship between household income, 
wealth and privatization. Policymakers have regarded housing privatization as a “shock 
absorber” during the transition period when real incomes of the majority of the population 
have been declining. Ownership of dwellings would increase one’s wealth hence making 
poorer households more likely candidates for privatization. 
The econometric model should also account for household-based differences in 
bequest and sale values of dwellings. The bequest motive will be stronger for older 
households making them more likely to privatize. Bequest and sale values may be low for 
households living in substandard and overcrowded dwellings. It has been the tradition under 
the socialist housing system to allocate housing on the basis of need, defined in relation to 
the government-established norm of dwelling area per person. Because they were eligible in 
the past, and the system remained in place at least for those already in the ”queue”, 
overcrowded households may choose to wait for better housing provided they remain tenants 
of the municipality. Hence overcrowding is expected to be negatively related to privatization. 
Finally there are many arguments for accounting for location effects.  Kosareva and 
Struyk (1993) suggest that the reasons why privatization rates may differ between cities may 
  15be due to the attitudes of the municipality to privatization. In addition enterprises owning 
enterprise housing may not be willing to let go of housing that they view as their property 
and in cities with a large share of enterprise housing privatization may consequently be 
slower. Using the same data source as this study, Berger et al, 2001 study of estimates of 
quality of life in Russian cities, finds important differences in amenities across the survey 
locations. They also find that people are paying high premium for better amenities. 
 Location effects can be important also because certain areas have traditionally been 
migration-destinations and so demand for housing and hence privatization rates are expected 
to be higher in such cities, (Guzanova, 1994). Some cities may experience high inflow of 
migrants from areas of armed conflict or other migration-pressures because of their 
geographic location (e.g. Rostov on Don has been the destination for people migrating from 
conflicts in the Caucasus). 
 
3.1. The Data 
The data used in the analysis come from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
(RLMS), an on-going nationally-representative survey of health and economic welfare in the 
Russian Federation started in 1992. The survey is maintained by the Carolina Population 
Center at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
The RLMS data contains a large and detailed set of socio-economic variables such as 
income, expenditure, employment, health, time use, housing and land use.   The RLMS used 
stratified sampling of twenty primary sampling units (PSUs). Stratified sampling is used to 
ensure greater variability than would have been captured in a simple random sample of 
regions.  Following the geographical distribution of the population the locations selected for 
  16the survey tend to be concentrated in the Western and South-Western parts of the country.  
Only two sites are located in the Far East region.  In each region data tend to be collected at a 
large-city sampling site and a small town or rural site located in the region (or oblast) around 
the city. This study uses the 1992-1994 data of the RLMS survey.  The average number of 
households in a PSU for the 1992-1994 data was 360.   
 The primary reason for using the data for the 1992-1994 period is that the most 
comprehensive set of housing variables is available for the first round of survey data 
collection (year 1992) and the same set of households is traced for the third and the fourth 
data collection rounds
5. The 1992 data contains privatization-related information such as 
households’ stated reasons to privatize their dwellings (e.g. bequest motive). The 1992 data 
also contains the most detailed information on dwelling characteristics. The 1994 (4
th) round 
question on the ownership status of the dwelling with a response category “privatized in the 
past few years” was used to construct the dependent variable for the analysis. The 1992-1994 
data was merged using the household and location identifiers.  
The data pertaining to the privatization decision were collected shortly after the 
privatization decision was made.  The timing of the data collection minimizes the bias from 
maturation
6. Another advantage of using the data from this early period of privatization is 
that it enables one to analyze the “early” decision-makers who privatized essentially in the 
absence of a developed housing market. 
                                                 
5 The survey underwent a major restructuring in the mid-1990s and as a result a different set of locations and 
households has been used from 1995 onwards. 
6 Maturation refers to the fact that if a lot of time passes between the time of privatization and the time 
of response, the respondents may state a different reason for privatization than the actual motivation or, simply, 
the respondents may forget pertinent information. 
 
  17  As time goes by, those who privatize may sell the dwelling and move. The 
households that moved are not traced by the survey so only the data for households that did 
not move between 1992 and 1994 are used in the analysis. For the 1992-1994 data the 
number of movers is smaller than for the subsequent years (around 2 %) so the sample that 
the study analyzes is least biased.  
Another important factor that needs to be taken into account in the econometric 
specification is that the percentage of housing eligible for privatization may be substantially 
different by locations. In large cities nearly all housing is eligible for privatization but in 
small cities and population centers there was less non-private housing and hence the set of 
housing eligible for privatization is smaller. I excluded those households who “always owned 
their dwellings”, as well as those in cooperative housing who became private owners by 
default. Hence the data set only contains those households that have the option to privatize 
their dwellings. There were 2956 households in the data set used in the estimation. 
 
3.2. Variables and Model Specification  
 
Dependent variable 
In the empirical analysis that follows it is assumed that the unit of analysis is the 
household who makes the decision to privatize the apartment. This is done to abstract from 
the decision-making within the household and assume that the decision is made by a single 
entity. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable (1 for privatization and 0 for 
municipal) reflecting individual household choice for privatization. The dependent variable 
was constructed using the first round data on privatization decision, the dwelling ownership 
  18data of the first, third and fourth round, and the fourth round data on the timing of 
privatization.   
 
Explanatory variables 
The explanatory variables are divided into household characteristics and dwelling 
characteristics. The summary of variables is reported in Table 3.  
 
Household characteristics: 
Household characteristics include total household income, age of the household head, 
number of adults, and a dichotomous variable for one or more household members having 
University education or higher. The education variable is a proxy for perceived risk aversion 
factor with higher education associated with lower perceived risk aversion. The age of 
household head variable is reflecting the rate of time preference
7. Household income and 
wealth were included to account for the relationship to risk aversion and to test the “housing 
as store of wealth” hypothesis. Risk-aversion and the need for liquidity may exert 
counteracting effects on the decision to privatize resulting in a non-linear (e.g. U-shaped) 
relationship between income/wealth and privatization. More specifically at lower levels of 
income risk aversion may lower privatization but the need for liquidity may increase 
privatization. Interaction variables separating higher and lower income groups were included 
in order to disentangle the effects. The number of adults controls for household composition 
because the decision of a household consisting of more than a nuclear family may be 
different from that consisting of a nuclear family.  A multi-generational household may want 
                                                 
7 A potential problem that this data set presents for analysis is whether the reported household head is 
representative of the household in multi-generational households 
 
  19to split thus accelerating privatization but on the other hand households in “crowded 





Dwelling characteristics include the characteristics of the building and the 
characteristics of the dwelling unit inside the building. Building characteristics include the 
age of building, minutes to transportation, type of building material (brick, or other material).  
Type of building material is included to account for differences in dwelling quality, and 
consequently differences in maintenance cost. Age of building is a proxy for the need for 
renovation in the absence of survey responses to the question on major renovation. 
Differences in maintenance cost are postulated to affect the decision to privatize. While there 
was a strong rationale to include the dichotomous variable for enterprise-owned dwelling to 
control for possible differences in the speed of privatization between municipally and 
enterprise-owned dwellings, there was not enough variation in the data as only 1 out of 751 
cases of enterprise-owned housing was privatized. Dwelling characteristic is the apartment 
having a balcony which is a desirable feature. Variables such as kitchen space and ceiling 
height were not included as they are correlated with the decade the building was built. Total 
space and total living space appeared to have been measured with error on a number of 
observations and were not included. The urban/rural dichotomous variable is included to 
account for potential differences in privatization rates between urban and rural areas. 
Random effects specification 
  20There may be unobserved characteristics of locations that contribute to the privatization 
decision, such as amenities or attitudes of the municipalities towards housing privatization. 
To better account for heterogeneity across the locations, a random effects specification with 
the error structure sitei + eij is assumed, where sitei is a random variable representing the 
deviation from the fixed effects portion of the predicted probability and eij is a random 
variable representing the deviation from the fixed effects portion of the predicted probability 
for household j at site i.  Further the specification assumes that the observations are 
independent across locations but not necessarily within locations. For example some 
locations may have higher proportion of university graduates or buildings built in a particular 
time period. Hubert-White robust standard errors are computed.  
 
Estimation and Results 
 The model was estimated using STATA 9.0 program to fit generalized linear latent 
and mixed models (GLLAMM) (Skrondal, A. and S. Rabe-Hesketh, 2003). The results are 
reported in Table 4 in the Appendix.  
The signs of the estimated effects are as suggested by the theoretical model. Higher 
quality reflected by newer buildings, brick wall material, balcony are positively related to the 
probability of privatization. There is also an expected result with respect to urban amenity: 
greater distance to public transport negatively affects privatization. There is no effect of 
urban location after accounting for effects of other variables.  This result indicates that there 
appear to be no underlying differences in how privatization proceeded in cities and small 
towns. 
  21Higher education has a positive effect on privatization decision. This result is 
expected: in the framework of the theoretical model higher education is associated with 
lower perceived risk aversion making privatization more likely. As predicted by the 
theoretical model, age of the household head also has a positive effect on privatization 
decision. The value of the estimated coefficient is small because it is the effect of each 
additional year of age on privatization.  The estimated effects of age and education are 
consistent with the results reported for the logit model of Struyk and Kosareva (1994).  
The number of adults has a negative effect, indicating that over-crowded households 
postpone privatization presumably in expectation of getting a larger dwelling from the state.  
There is no effect of income or wealth on the privatization decision. The implication 
is that homeownership does not appear to be used as source of additional income by lower 
income households. Absence of a substantiated relationship to income does not allow to 
consider explanation based on risk aversion. It is also possible that income and wealth were 
measured with error because the respondents could have been misstating their responses. 
4. Conclusion  
While privatization is a normative objective of the Russian government, it still has not 
been completed. The current deadline for free-of-charge privatization of housing is set for 
2010. This analysis highlights the fact that besides the uncertainty prevalent in the transition 
process, uncertainty over maintenance significantly affects housing privatization. This 
suggests that in order to foster housing privatization the Russian government needs to 
develop a more systematic approach for the maintenance of the existing housing stock. This 
along with less uncertainty over the legal and institutional framework of the economy will 
help in the privatization of housing. The econometric analysis reveals that education plays an 
  22important role in the privatization decision. The fact that education is important seems to 
suggest that uncertainty plays a key role since the more educated are better able to predict the 
future and the (uncertain) outcomes of the proximate variables affecting privatization 
decision. Contrary to expectations, household income does not appear to have an effect on 
the privatization decision.  An important policy implication of this result is that it does not 
support the notion that poorer households view housing as an asset and are taking advantage 
of its potential to improve their welfare as the housing reform envisaged. More generally it 
underscores the need for greater understanding of the role of income and wealth and their 
measurement during economic transition.   
Further Research 
This study concentrated on the issue of maintenance as the main obstacle to 
privatization of housing. There are other features of housing reform that influence the 
decision to be become owners such as deadline to complete free of charge privatization that 
has been extended in the future a number of times and ended up not been credible.  Another 
set of determinants of the privatization decision that was not analyzed in this study is that of 
intra-building governance. The component of uncertainty associated with intra-building 
governance was subsumed under the common uncertainty term. Management and 
governance issues are unequivocally important issues but the scope for empirical study is 
limited for lack of intra-building neighbor data.  
The research questions in this study were conditioned by data availability. Since 
privatization is continuing to this day as municipal housing that can be privatized is being 
built, it could have been also appropriate to model the decision of when to privatize rather 
than whether to privatize. But because data on privatization is available for three survey 
  23rounds for years 1991-1993, empirical testing using an econometric model (e.g. survival 
analysis for the actual decision-making  period of the 1990s and beyond) would not be 
possible. However a theoretical model of more than two periods could involve working out 
the true discounted cost of purchase and renting and address the question of when to 
privatize.     
An interesting caveat is that some households, such as overcrowded ones are more eligible 
for municipally-built free apartment give-away than others. Delaying privatization introduces 
additional uncertainty because the regulations with respect to types of households eligible for 
apartment give-away are changing. The theoretical model could incorporate the trade-off 
between delaying privatization, waiting for a give-away apartment from the state and 
immediate privatization. The specification of the econometric model could be enriched with 
the addition of a set of variables that reflect amenities across the locations (Berger et al, 
2001). These variables could be constructed using the RLMS community survey data.  
The contribution of this study is that it offers a better understanding of the structural 
components of the privatization decision in Russia. It is also one of the first attempts to 
formally model the phenomenon of housing privatization from the point of view of the 
household. The findings can inform housing policies in Russia and future housing 
privatization efforts in other countries.  
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Table 1. Percentage of households who answered “yes” to the Russia 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey question: “Do you want your dwelling to become 
private property of your family?” 
RLMS site  1992  1993 
St. Petersburg City  66.85  67.16 
St. Petersburg Oblast  72.99  76.14 
Novgorod city  67.80  64.43 
Moscow city  67.45  72.39 
Moscow oblast: town of Chekhov  58.88  74.49 
Riazan oblast: Riazhski district  57.24  54.55 
Riazan oblast: Saraevski district  62.00  54.32 
Tatarstan: city of Kazan  63.46  76.88 
Saratov oblast:  61.70  74.86 
Kabardino-Balkaria: city of Nalchik  89.89  91.94 
Stavropol Krai  91.43  75.00 
Rostov oblast  85.03  80.13 
Svedlovsk oblast  53.55  63.10 
Chelyabinsk oblast  60.84  62.50 
Altai: city of Gorno-Altaisk  67.16  83.33 
Tomsk oblast: Zyraianskii district  68.75  74.49 
Primosrki Krai  70.00  71.29 
Total for surveyed sites  65.89  70.43 
Source: Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
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Table 2 Housing Privatization in Russia, 1989-2006 
 Number  of 
Privatized units, 
thousands 
Total area of 
privatized units, 
million sq. meters
Privatized units as 
percent of units 
eligible for 
privatization 
1989 10  n/a 0.03 
1990 43  2 0.1 
1991 122 n/a 0.4 
1992 2631 132 8 
1993 5804 n/a 18 
1994 2396 n/a 9 
1995 1529 72 6 
1996 1203 57 5 
1997 1198 56 5 
1998 959 46 5 
1999 896 39 5 
2000 922 42 4 
2001 1302 62 6 
2002 1395 68 7 
2003 897 5 
2004 1408 8 
2005 1822 11 
2006 1624 11 
Cumulative in 2006   26161 66 





















  28Table 3: Decrepit and unsafe housing, major renovation of housing stock,  
Russian Federation, 1990-2008 
 
  
Major renovation of 
housing stock, thousands 
square meters 




Percent of decrepit 
and unsafe housing 
stock in total 
housing stock  
  1990                                        n/a  32179.2 1.3
1992  22160                                  n/a                             n/a 
1993  22798                                  n/a                             n/a 
1994  9022                                  n/a                             n/a 
1995 11666 37723.5 1.4
1996 7349 40288.8 1.5
1997 6392 42350 1.6
1998 5060 45563.7 1.7
1999 4125 49622.9 1.8
2000 3832 65603.6 2.4
2001 4780 87826.1 3.1
2002 4833 88287.1 3.1
2003 4625 91255.3 3.2
2004 4768 92954.4 3.2
2005 5552 94589.1 3.2
2006 5302 95889.4 3.2
2007 6869 n/a  n/a 
2008 12381 n/a  n/a 




Table 4. Summary of Variables 
Privatized their dwelling  22.5% of households 
Number of adults in the household  Mean 2.1 
Age of Household head  Mean 56 
At least one household member University Educated 28.6% of households 
Decade Building Built  Mode 1960s 
Time of walk to public transportation  Mean 8 minutes 
Unit with Balcony  70% of all dwellings 
Brick building  42 % of all dwellings 
Urban location  75.2% 
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Age of Household head  .039452       0.0053843  7.33  0.0000
At least one University Educ.  .3827585      .09519       4.02    0.0000
Decade Building Built  .0727532    .0464229      1.57     0.117 
# minutes to public transport  -.0338025    .0103766     -3.26     0.001 
Unit with Balcony  .2761571    .1525446      1.81     0.070 
Brick building  .2977753    .1235308      2.41  0.016 
Urban location  .3202176  .2576236      1.24     0.214 
 
Table 5A. Random effects for locations 
  Mean effect  Standard error 
St. Petersburg City  0.0808  0.1519 
St. Petersburg Oblast  0.383  0.177 
Novgorod city  -0.7011  0.2026 
Moscow city  -0.1339  0.1691 
Moscow oblast: town of Chekhov  -0.9122  0.2425 
Riazan oblast: Riazhski district -0.5282  0.2608 
Riazan oblast: Saraevski district  -0.1438  0.4009 
Tatarstan: city of Kazan  -3.1819  0.5523 
Saratov oblast:  -0.1428  0.2522 
Kabardino-Balkaria: city of Nalchik  -0.2555  0.1822 
Stavropol Krai               1.3486  0.3358 
Novocherkassk   0.2544  0.1807 
Ekaterinburg   0.2758  0.1573 
Rostov oblast  0.3829  0.1627 
Sverdlovsk oblast  -0.4553  0.2822 
Chelyabinsk oblast  -0.1046  0.3105 
Altai: city of Gorno-Altaisk  1.94  0.3814 
Tomsk oblast: Zyraianskii district  1.921  0.2681 
Primosrki Krai  -0.1725  0.1691 
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